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A Tiny Firm Was Hired to Run ICE’s Biggest Detention Facility. Here’s How It All Imploded.

By Samantha Michaels 

Back in January, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) announced two deaths at Camp East Montana, the nation’s biggest immigrant detention center. At the time, the facility at Fort Bliss in El Paso, Texas, was operated by a tiny contractor most people had never heard of.
The agency reported that Geraldo Lunas Campos, a 55-year-old from Cuba, had been found “in distress” and died after “lifesaving measures.” Victor Manuel Diaz, a 36-year-old from Nicaragua, had been found with “a ligature around his neck”—likely suicide.
ICE, it turns out, didn’t share the full story. By the end of January, a medical examiner had determined that Lunas Campos actually died by homicide—guards asphyxiated him while restraining him to stop him from self-harm. Now, records obtained in a Freedom of Information Act request show that ICE privately blamed its contractor for failing to stop Diaz’s death—so much so, that the agency cited it as one of multiple reasons for ending the company’s roughly $1.3 billion contract.
The records are communications between ICE and the contractor, Acquisition Logistics, a small Virginia-based company that went from relative obscurity to the subject of national headlines after the Trump administration asked it to build and manage Camp East Montana in 2025. At the time, it had no prior experience in incarceration and was so small it operated out of a single-family home. Archived screenshots of its website—whose header simply said “Site maintenance in progress”—showed it had once specialized in supply chain management.
When ICE ended its contract in March, a year and a half early, the agency didn’t elaborate publicly on the reason, simply saying a bigger company would possess the “size, maturity and pedigree” to implement “higher standards of medical care, more thorough case processing and intake procedures, and delivery of performance requirements according to well-defined accountability measures.” The records Mother Jones obtained include “Contract Discrepancy Reports” and other documents that outline, in more detail, exactly what standards were not met—and the deadly consequences.
Acquisition Logistics’ relationship with ICE soured quickly, the records show. In the beginning, its main point of contact for Camp East Montana was not the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), but the Pentagon: Even though the camp would detain immigrants, the Navy had awarded the contract. “It’s weird,” Charles Tiefer, a professor emeritus of government contracting at the University of Baltimore law school, told me at the time.
“It seems messy,” added Claire Trickler-McNulty, who served as an ICE official in the Obama, Biden, and first Trump administrations.
As I reported then, DHS had tried to award the contract before the Navy did, to a firm called Deployed Resources, but canceled the deal days later “for convenience,” according to a government website that cited an executive order about “wasteful spending.”
This was an extremely unusual move, and some current and former ICE officials speculated that ­Deployed lost the job for political reasons. The Washington Free Beacon reported in 2023 that Deployed had snagged no-bid contracts for immigrant detention under President Joe Biden, and that a member of its board was married to the former chief of staff for Kamala Harris’ husband, Doug Emhoff. (The DC Enquirer called it “Kamala’s cronyism.”) A DHS spokesperson dismissed this as speculation, saying the contract was canceled due to an “inability to meet the specialized needs of the facility.”
Not long after ditching Deployed, ICE put the Fort Bliss contract out for bids again, and then quickly pulled it a second time, without explanation. The job went to Acquisition Logistics in the summer of 2025 under a Navy special contracting program in which only small businesses could apply. “If you want a detention center run by people who know what they’re doing, you hold serious competition, but that takes time,” Tiefer, the contracting expert, told me. “This is the third time they’re trying to make a procurement, and they’re under the gun—gotta get those detention centers up and running, gotta meet the quota. They were just betting [Acquisition Logistics] would have the minimum competence to hold the thing together, join in picking the subcontractors, and supervise them.”
It was “an absolute rush,” says Congresswoman Veronica Escobar, an El Paso Democrat whose district includes the camp. “Donald Trump and Stephen Miller wanted to do it the easiest, quickest way possible.”
Things went about as smoothly as one might expect. Although Camp East Montana was up and running in impressive time—ground broke in July 2025 and new detainees were arriving by August—a worker died during construction and, by September, journalists were documenting horrific conditions inside. ICE’s own inspectors found 60 violations of federal detention standards in 50 days, the Washington Post reported. “That was somewhat shocking,” recalls Michelle Brané, who led the Biden administration’s Office of the Immigration Detention Ombudsman, the main oversight body for ICE detention. 
It’s not unusual for a new detention facility to have problems, so the best practice is to open it slowly—but that didn’t happen here, says former ICE official Trickler-McNulty, who has worked on contracts and detention standards. “None of it sounds like good governance,” she told me.
In October 2025, after Camp East Montana was operational, the administration transferred oversight of Acquisition Logistics’ contract from the Pentagon to ICE, according to emails I obtained. Later that month, an ICE contracting officer wrote CEO Ken Wagner to say that the funding wasn’t officially locked in yet, but that the company should proceed anyway because the work was “mission-essential.”
Wagner agreed, but by November 2025, emails show that his firm was desperate for cash. (Many federal contractors have struggled to be reimbursed promptly on Trump’s watch, according to Brané.) “As a small business, ALC and subs cannot continue to perform at such a high risk. Payrolls have to be met, vendors have to be paid, and it really is a crisis situation,” a company rep wrote to ICE.
Some funding came through soon after, but the relationship remained strained. On December 11, Wagner explained in a letter that ICE’s communications with his team had been “ineffective and, at times, perceived as threatening.”
“This has created an environment of uncertainty, hindered productive dialogue, and is creating significant concerns between ALC and our subcontractors,” he wrote. With discussions “eroding,” Wagner added, he was seeking “assistance in resetting our relationship to move forward in a more productive fashion.”
He provided excerpts from the allegedly threatening communications—all redacted in the documents I received. But other records show that ICE had expressed concerns over Acquisition Logistics’ lapse of liability insurance, a detainee’s escape, and problems with medical care. The agency had even sent a “Show Cause Notice” to the company in early October, days after taking control of the contract. “[Y]ou are hereby provided the opportunity to present any facts or explanations that demonstrate why the contract should not be terminated,” an ICE officer had written.
It had been complicated, Wagner said in his letter, for his company to transition from Pentagon to DHS control and navigate the agencies’ different expectations. He remained worried about a “lack of payment 75 days into the Option Period,” which posed “unnecessary and significant risks” to his business.
“Despite our repeated efforts to seek clarification and guidance, ALC has not received a government response to our concerns, leading to resource inefficiencies in our operations,” Wagner wrote. He requested a meeting with ICE officials to discuss solutions and figure out how to stop “de-railing productive hours” to messy back-and-forth.
Little seemed to improve. In February, an ICE contracting officer sent Acquisition Logistics another “Show Cause Notice” threatening to end the partnership. The CEO likely understood what this meant, Tiefer told me: “He can hear they’re clicking the rifle bolts on the firing squad. He’s writing his will at this point.”
The camp’s security protocols were not up to standard either, ICE said. In January, an officer’s firearm had gone missing, along with the spare key to the locker where it was stored. Transportation delays resulted “in significant operational disruptions” and janitorial services were inadequate. Housing units were supposed to be cleaned daily by staff, but an inspection found they were cleaned only once a week—and that guards had, on occasion, convinced detainees to clean for them by offering cookies.
Some of these allegations appeared in a Government Accountability Office report over the summer and received media coverage, but the records I obtained from ICE went into greater detail.
For one, in February, subcontractor Amentum Services “unilaterally” decided to cut detainees’ food intake below the contractual minimum of 3,000 calories a day. This deprivation resulted in “active hunger strikes” and “threats of riots,” ICE wrote. (Neither Amentum nor Acquisition Logistics and ICE responded to requests for comment for this story.)
Another subcontractor, Akima, let its guards track daily operations at the facility in a damaged logbook with missing pages—which became a problem, ICE wrote, after Geraldo Lunas Campos died. A witness told the Associated Press that Lunas Campos was handcuffed, tackled by guards, and put in a chokehold until he went unconscious. ICE’s report offered new details: Lunas Campos was restrained on the ground by four officers after he’d tried to hang himself, it said. One officer placed an arm around the man’s neck and another around his armpits with clasped hands, and all four officers were on top of him. When they eventually turned Lunas Campos on his side, he was unresponsive, with vomit on the floor.
“Lack of timely and complete information regarding the destruction of the logbook impeded the [Detainee Death Review] panel’s ability to establish an accurate timeline and conduct a thorough review,” ICE wrote, and also to assess officers’ compliance with use-of-force standards.
Lunas Campos’ family is suing Acquisition Logistics, Akima, and the guards for wrongful death, according to an attorney representing them, Will Horowitz, who told me it’s unclear whether the incident was adequately investigated by the government. “There’s so little that has been said in public about this.”
Another serious allegation involved the case of Victor Manuel Diaz, who was shipped to Camp East Montana after ICE arrested him on January 6 in Minnesota.
Eight days later, ICE wrote in its notice to Acquisition Logistics, custody officers moved Diaz from his dormitory to a medical holding room after he said he’d experienced harassment and “possible sexual abuse”—a detail that hadn’t been publicly reported, according to Rep. Escobar. (ICE has only cited the alleged harassment.) Diaz was scheduled for a Prison Rape Elimination Act interview. A behavioral health provider wrote that he had a “disheveled appearance, depressed mood, flat affect, and low, quiet speech,” though he’d denied that he was contemplating suicide.
ICE’s detention standards require placing at-risk detainees in suicide-resistant cells with “constant or close monitoring”—specifically, at irregular intervals no more than 15 minutes apart. But Diaz was put in a holding room with less frequent monitoring “despite risk indicators,” the agency wrote. He was observed awake at 2 p.m. and asleep at 2:30 p.m. and 3 p.m., the log indicated. Half an hour later staff found him hanging from a sheet he’d removed from his bed.
Staffers took Diaz’s body down and placed it on the bed. Failing to find a pulse, camp medical personnel began CPR and other emergency measures. He was officially pronounced dead at 4:09. Although the “medical response was initiated promptly after discovery,” ICE noted, “the timeline indicates a possible delay in recognizing the emergency and notifying ICE”—and CPR should not have been performed on a soft surface like the bed. “The incident suggests a lack of staff vigilance and possible gaps in suicide prevention training, as staff failed to identify and respond to risk factors and did not maintain required observation protocols.”
ICE wrote that it had reviewed several cases of suicidal detainees at Camp East Montana in which officers hadn’t checked in at staggered 15-minute intervals as required—this problem has plagued ICE detention under past administrations as well, Brané told me. “Detainees on suicide watch are being placed in cells that contain objects and elements that can be used for self-harm,” ICE officials wrote, citing metal benches in holding cells, pony walls around toilets, and instruments affixed to the walls of medical bays.
Camp East Montana, the officials noted, also lacked policies to safely remove a person from suicide watch—one detainee, name redacted, was taken off watch despite suicidal ideation and a plan to act on it. And though detainees are supposed to receive mental health screening within 12 hours of admission, at least one wasn’t screened for about a month, despite indications of mental illness, the agency wrote. 
Months before Diaz’s death, ICE also had raised concerns with Acquisition Logistics because the facility’s medical holding rooms lacked “vision panel doors” that would allow officials to monitor the people inside; the company had promised to install the panels but hadn’t. The “failure to promptly address a previously identified and documented security deficiency,” its notice said, “represents a significant lapse in corrective action and facility safety management, and is a material contributing factor in the inability to prevent or timely intervene in the suicide of Mr. Diaz.”
“This incident resulted in the loss of life and exposes the facility, staff, and detainees to increased risk,” ICE added.
“This was a known screw-up,” Tiefer says of the vision panel doors. It seems “the suicide was the straw that broke the camel’s back and led ICE to dump Acquisition Logistics.”
Diaz had entered the United States in 2024 and was working to send money home to his family in Nicaragua, to help them save for a house. “Victor was law-abiding. He had never been in trouble in Nicaragua and, as we understand, was detained by ICE for missing an immigration court date—not for any crime,” his family said in a statement after his death.
In late February, 24 members of Congress wrote to DHS, citing safety concerns and calling for Camp East Montana to be “shut down.” On March 3, ICE sent another notice of “non-conforming performance” that again highlighted Diaz’s death and the infrequent cleaning of housing units, along with a detainee’s escape in October. Ten days later, it announced publiclythat the contract would be terminated and that Amentum, the subcontractor that had cut meals to less than 3,000 calories, would take over. Amentum was a much bigger firm, with a long history of federal contracting. But conditions at the facility remained dire afterward, according to a lawsuit against ICE that cites, among other problems, medical neglect, staff violence, and inadequate food.
ICE apparently wasn’t “seeking a huge change if they just signed a contract with a vendor that was already running parts of the facility they were ostensibly unhappy with,” says Trickler-McNulty, the former ICE official, when I asked about the inadequate meals. But the administration “wants this facility; they likely didn’t want disruption in detention services, so they signed the agreement.”
Brané views the contract swap as a sign of just how bad conditions had become under Acquisition Logistics: worse than even ICE could tolerate. But “it’s probably gotten just as bad at a lot of facilities,” she says, noting that DHS shut down the independent oversight office she used to lead. “We are hearing more and more of these kinds of things, and there is no place to file a complaint and have it addressed, and so conditions have deteriorated across the board.”
Rep. Escobar told me she is glad Acquisition Logistics was fired and that she wants the company to be investigated. But she says it’s not the only entity that should be held accountable. For months, detainees had told her about poor conditions, but the career ICE personnel working at the facility brushed her off. They were “saying, ‘It’s all a lie,’ and it wasn’t,” she says. “They know better. There should have been alarm bells screaming up and down the chain.”
The administration should have forced Acquisition Logistics to address deficiencies immediately—or fired the company quicker, she says. Normally, Trickler-McNulty adds, ICE would use financial sanctions to hold a company accountable for problems early on, but the records we obtained show no signs of that. “There’s blame to be laid not just at the contractor’s feet,” Escobar says. “We have an obligation in Congress to look at the enablers.”

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